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 2 
Introduction 
The Irish industrial relations (IR) system has traditionally been 
characterised as “voluntarist”. This means there is a relative absence of legal 
intervention in collective employment relations. There is no obligation on 
employers to recognise a trade union for collective bargaining purposes, for 
example, and collective agreements are generally not legally binding.1 
Regardless of whether or not a trade union is present in a workplace, legally 
grounded employee rights to information and consultation, or to input into 
organisational decision-making, in Ireland have been traditionally rather 
limited. In this context, the passing, in 2002, of the Information and 
Consultation Directive2 (hereinafter “the Directive”), opened up the possibility 
of considerable adjustment to the Irish model of IR. This article examines the 
transposition of the Directive by means of the Employees (Provision of 
Information and Consultation) Act 2006 (hereinafter “the Act”) and assesses 
the extent to which the legislation is likely to be successful in securing robust 
information and consultation rights for Irish employees in both unionised and 
non-unionised workplaces. In the case of the former, the implications of the 
legislation for trade unions will also be considered. The article is set out as 
follows. First, the voluntarist model will be outlined in more detail. Second, the 
background and context of the Directive and its transposition (in terms of the 
key provisions of the 2006 Act) will be assessed. Finally, the implications of 
the Act for greater employee involvement and input at organisational level 
(and its potential to “plug” the voluntarist gaps identified) will be examined.  
 
Voluntary Health? 
Traditionally collective employment relations in Ireland have been 
considered in terms of the relationships between employers and trade unions. 
In this context, voluntarism refers to a situation whereby employees have a 
constitutional right to form and join trade unions, but employers are not 
obliged to recognise such unions as having the right to represent their 
members in negotiations over employment issues.3 Unlike the situation in the 
UK, for example, there is no statutory recognition scheme under which 
employers can, in certain circumstances, be mandated to recognise trade 
unions for bargaining purposes.4 Where trade unions are recognised for 
bargaining purposes, no Irish provision exists equivalent to section 181(2) of 
the UK’s Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 under 
which employers are obliged to disclose “certain specified information without 
which a union would be materially impeded in collective bargaining and which 
it would be in accordance with good industrial relations practice to disclose”. 
                                               
1
 Anthony Kerr and Gerry Whyte, Irish Trade Union Law (Professional Books Limited, 1985). 
2
 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community OJ L80/02. 
3
 Kerr and Whyte, note 1, at 15. 
4
 Under the UK’s Employment Relations Act 1999, employers can be forced to recognise 
trade unions for bargaining purposes where the majority of employees, and 40% percent of all 
workers in the bargaining unit, vote for union recognition. 
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Where collective bargaining does take place, it is important to note that, under 
Irish law, collective agreements reached have generally been regarded as 
non-binding.5  
Certain exceptions to this general rule exist, such as where collective 
agreements are registered with the Labour Court.6 Also, Joint Labour 
Committees (JLCs) provide for the fixing of minimum rates of pay and the 
regulation of employment in certain sectors where there is little or no 
collective bargaining and where significant numbers of vulnerable workers are 
employed (e.g. the Hotels sector).7 JLCs set legally binding minimum wages 
and conditions of employment for workers covered. Collective agreements 
made by Joint Industrial Councils (JICs; voluntary negotiating bodies for an 
industry or part of an industry, designed to facilitate collective bargaining at 
industry level in certain sectors) are also registered with the Labour Court and 
are legally binding. 8 They generally exist in sectors with a relatively high level 
of unionisation (e.g. the Construction sector).  
The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004 represent a 
recent attempt to deal with disputes in workplaces where no collective 
bargaining mechanisms are present. Under this legislation, an employer may 
be compelled to grant trade union representatives the right to represent 
unionised employees on workplace issues relating to pay, and terms and 
conditions of employment. The Labour Court can make a binding 
determination with regard to these matters, and to dispute resolution and 
disciplinary procedures, in the employment concerned but cannot provide for 
arrangements for collective bargaining.9  
A defining feature of these situations in which employers can be 
compelled to negotiate with employees through their trade union 
representatives is that they apply, for various reasons, to fewer and fewer 
workers. Primarily, this is because trade union density has dropped 
considerably in Ireland over the course of the last twenty years and now 
stands at approximately 35% (in the private sector, the figure is approximately 
20%).10 Many organisations (particularly in the service industries) do not 
engage in collective bargaining and do not recognise trade unions. Efforts by 
the trade union movement to pursuade the legislature to introduce a 
mandatory recognition scheme along the lines of that in the UK have failed. A 
High-Level group was set up to examine the issue (under the social 
partnership agreement, Partnership 2000) and its views were incorporated 
into the framing of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001. Trade 
unions had hoped to use this legislation, which does not, as noted, provide for 
collective bargaining, as a “springboard” to greater recognition rights. 
However, the legislation has been regarded as largely neutered in this respect 
                                               
5
 Goulding Chemicals Ltd. v Bolger [1977] IR 211. But see also O’ Rourke v Talbot Ireland Ltd 
[1984] ILRM 587, where a collective agreement was enforced at the level of the individual 
contract of employment. 
6
 Part III, Industrial Relations Act 1946. 
7
 Part IV, Industrial Relations Act 1946. 
8
 Part V, Industrial Relations Act 1946. 
9
 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, section 6(2). 
10
 Brian Sheehan, “Union Density Drops 10% in a Decade” (2005) 35 IRN 12. 
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following the decision in Ryanair v The Labour Court.11 There, the Supreme 
Court was critical of the procedures adopted by the Labour Court in hearing 
claims under the legislation; in particular, the Supreme Court felt that 
employees on behalf of whom claims were taken should ideally give oral 
evidence. The Supreme Court also ruled that the Labour Court had erred in 
law (due partially to its “mindset”, which favoured the way particular 
expressions are used and particular activities are carried out by trade unions) 
in its interpretation of what was meant by “collective bargaining” and what 
constituted an “excepted body”. The number of claims processed under the 
2001-2004 Acts has fallen dramatically in the wake of the decision. In any 
case the legislation deals only with specific disputes, rather than ongoing 
employer-trade union/employee relationships. Finally, the JLC system came 
under threat in early 2008, as a result of a legal challenge by the Irish Hotels 
Federation (IHF) questioning, inter alia, the constitutionality of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1946, insofar as it empowers the Labour Court to issue 
Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) to set wages for sectors covered by 
JLCs.12 The case was settled in relation to procedural flaws admitted by the 
Labour Court, and although constitutional arguments were advanced by the 
IHF, settlement was reached before they were responded to by counsel for 
the State. This, of course, leaves open the possibility of a further challenge in 
the future.  
  Given all of the above, some commentators have argued that it is now 
inaccurate to describe the Irish employment relations system as voluntarist, 
due to the decline in trade union density and voluntary collective bargaining, 
and the parallel expansion in individual employment rights, which has 
arguably resulted in a transition from a bargaining-based employment 
relations system to a rights-based system.13 Redmond notes that the social 
partnership agreement, Sustaining Progress, launched a proliferation of 
regulation for Ireland’s labour law.14 However, she identifies three themes; 
first, the proposed laws almost exclusively concerned individual employment 
rights, second, the majority contained anti-discrimination measures, and 
finally, almost all were inspired (or required) by EU membership.15 Thus, prior 
to the 2006 Act, employee rights to information, consultation and negotiation 
at work, outside of the floor of rights provided in certain areas like pay, 
remained largely determined by the parties themselves, with minimal legal 
intervention.  
Given the trends in relation to union density, attention has recently 
shifted to obligations that exist on employers in non-union settings to inform 
and consult with their workers. Prior to the 2006 Act, the principal statutory 
                                               
11
 [2007] IESC 6. See Maura Connolly, “Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
2004—Implications for industrial relations law and practice of the Supreme Court decision in 
Ryanair v Labour Court and IMPACT” (2007) 4 IELJ 37; Michael Doherty, “Union Sundown? 
The Future of Collective Representation Rights in Irish Law” (2007) 4 IELJ 96. 
12
 Any decision would most likely also have implications for the JIC system. 
13
 Paul Teague, “New Developments in Employment Dispute Resolution” (2005) 4 LRC Rev 
5. 
14
 Mary Redmond, “The Future of Labour Law” (2004) 1 IELJ 3. 
15
 And, as Hayes points out, much EU-inspired employment legislation itself relates to 
individual rights, such as equal pay, non-discrimination and so on; Brian Hayes, “Informing 
and Consulting Employees-Irish and EU Developments” (2005) 2 IELJ 89. 
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obligations arose in the context of the requirements of EU law. The 
Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 
implements the European Works Councils Directive16 and requires works 
councils to be set up for consultation purposes in specified large, 
transnational organisations. The Protection of Employment Act 1977 (as 
amended by the Protection of Employment Order 199617) and the Protection 
of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) 
Act 200718 both oblige employers to consult with employee representatives 
with a view to reaching agreement on how collective redundancies should be 
effected. The European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of 
Undertakings) Regulations 200319 give effect to the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive,20 which requires the appointment of employee representatives for 
information and consultation purposes in advance of the transfer, or sale as a 
going concern, of a business. The European Company Statute21 provides for 
board-level employee involvement in certain, specified circumstances. Also, 
the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 requires consultation with 
employee representatives on various matters relating to health and safety in 
the workplace.22  
 
Let’s Get Talking: A Euro-vision 
In virtually all of the situations outlined above, the worker rights are 
activated in the context of a specific employer-initiated event (e.g. 
redundancy, sale of a business) and therefore information and consultation 
rights tend to be temporary and ad hoc; what can be termed an “event driven 
disclosure model”.23 This model tends to focus on procedural justice in a 
specific context, is palliative rather than preventative, and rights granted under 
such a model have no continuous impact on the employment relationship. 
This contrasts with an “agenda driven disclosure model”24 whereby the trigger 
lies within a bargaining/consultation agenda, and where information and 
                                               
16
 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale 
groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees OJ L254/64. 
17
 SI No. 370 of 1996. 
18
 Both of which take account of the Consolidated Collective Redundancies Directive, Council 
Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies OJ L225/98. 
19
 SI No. 131 of 2003. 
20
 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses OJ L82/01. 
21
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees OJ L294/01. 
22
 This Act further implements Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
work OJ L183/89. 
23
 Howard Gospel, Graeme Lockwood and Paul Willman “A British Dilemma: Disclosure of 
Information for Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation” (2003) 22 Comparative Labour 
Law and Policy Journal 327, at 346. 
24
 Ibid.  
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consultation rights cover a range of interlinked issues and involve an ongoing 
relationship between employers and employees.   
In recent years, a key focus of EU policy debate has been the need to 
improve economic performance while maintaining and protecting labour 
standards and delivering “better jobs”. The Lisbon Strategy seeks to make 
Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, and there is a view that increasingly what will differentiate European 
economies from low-cost competitors is the focus on “knowledge” and on 
exploiting the comparative advantage of better-educated European 
workforces (human capital). After all, the knowledge-based economy that the 
EU (and Ireland) is so keen to establish is inconceivable without the active 
involvement of individual employees.25 The debate on worker participation is 
not just a recent one. As Barnard points out, the European Commission has 
had an agenda on worker information, consultation and participation, which 
stretches back some 30 years to the early 1970s.26 Such a view is explicit in 
Title III of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which specifically protects 
workers' rights to information and consultation within the undertaking27 
and Articles 137-139 EC, which promote “social dialogue”. At Member State 
level, too, the vast majority of the “old” EU15 have long had in place 
mechanisms providing for information and consultation of employees at the 
workplace (for example, the statutory works councils that exist in Germany 
and France28). Ireland and the UK are the odd ones out here as neither 
country has a general, permanent and statutory system of information and 
consultation or employee representation. Nevertheless, the Irish social 
partnership process since 1987 (with its emphasis on encouraging partnership 
at the level of the enterprise29) has also been framed in terms of 
inclusiveness, participation and workplace democracy.  
It is in this context that the Information and Consultation Directive was 
passed and transposed in Ireland by means of the 2006 Act. The primary 
purpose of the Act is to provide for the establishment of a general framework 
setting out minimum requirements for the right to information and consultation 
of qualifying employees, and to provide a general right to information and 
consultation for employees from their employer on matters that directly affect 
them. The article will go on to assess how robust these rights are likely to be 
in the context of the provisions of the Act. The likely impact of the legislation 
for trade unions (who may have hoped to use it as a platform to seek 
recognition and negotiation rights30) in qualifying organisations will also be 
considered.  
 
                                               
25
 Keith Sissen, The Information and Consultation Directive: Unnecessary “Regulation” or an 
Opportunity to Promote “Partnership”? (2002) Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations Number 
67. 
26
 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law (3rd ed, Oxford, 2006), at chapter 15. 
27
 Article II-87. 
28
 Andrea Broughton, “European Comparative Practice in Information and Consultation”, in 
John Storey ed, Adding Value Through Information and Consultation (Palgrave, 2005). The 
practices of the “new” Member States are also outlined in the chapter cited. 
29
 See section 9.15 of Partnership 2000; Framework V of the Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness; Part 2, section 5 of Sustaining Progress; and Part 2, section 6 of Towards 2016. 
30
 Maura Connolly, “Consultation With Employees” (2004) 1 IELJ 36. 
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The 2006 Act: Talking About a Revolution? 
The Directive contains a general framework setting out minimum 
requirements for employee rights to information and consultation. Article 4 
requires that employees have rights to information on the recent and probable 
development of the undertaking or establishment’s activities and economic 
situation; rights to be informed and consulted on the situation, structure, and 
probable development of employment within the undertaking or establishment 
and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a 
threat to employment; and rights to be informed and consulted on decisions 
likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual 
relations, with a view to reaching agreement. The Directive was to be 
implemented by the Member States by March 2005 but for countries with no 
“general, permanent and statutory” system of information and consultation or 
employee representation (essentially Ireland and the UK) a phased 
introduction was permitted, with full application by March 2008.  
The Irish legislation was passed in 2006 and came into force for 
undertakings31 with at least 150 employees from 4 September 2006, for 
undertakings with at least 100 employees from 23 March 2007 and for 
undertakings with at least 50 employees from 23 March 2008.32 The 
legislation, therefore, only applies to employees working in organisations with 
at least 50 employees. Some concern has been expressed in the UK about 
the exclusion of businesses with as many as, for example, 40 or 45 
employees,33 and this is especially relevant for Ireland, where there are well in 
excess of 200,000 small and medium enterprises, which typically each 
employ 27 people (and about half the national workforce in total).34 An 
“employee” is defined in section 2 as someone “who has entered into or works 
under a contract of employment” and so, despite lobbying from the trade 
union movement, does not explicitly cover agency workers or others engaged 
in “atypical work”.   
 
Trigger Happy? 
The Act provides for three types of information and consultation 
agreements, but significantly, rights under the Act must be “triggered”. Section 
7 provides that the employer may initiate negotiations or employees may 
request negotiations with the employer to establish information and 
consultation arrangements. The employer is only obliged to set up information 
and consultation structures where requested to do so by 10% of the 
workforce, subject to a minimum of 15 employees and a maximum of 100 
                                               
31
 The Directive offered a choice to Member States of applying its requirements to 
“undertakings” employing at least 50 employees or “establishments” employing at least 20 
employees. An “undertaking” is defined as a public or private undertaking carrying out an 
economic activity, whether or not operating for gain (section 2). 
32
 Section 4. 
33
 Keith Ewing and G.M. Truter, “The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations: 
Voluntarism’s Bitter Legacy” (2005) 68 MLR 626. 
34
 See http://www.skillsireland.ie/press/reports/pdf/egfsn060512_sme_report_webopt.pdf 
(visited 18 January 2008). Note that the obligation to negotiate with employee representatives 
under the collective redundancies legislation applies to companies with 20 or more 
employees; section 6(a) Protection of Employment Act 1977 (as amended).   
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employees.35 The unions have been particularly critical of this provision, 
arguing (in reference to the 10% of employees required to trigger a request) 
that there cannot be “a plebiscite on a right”.36 Hayes has argued that the 
Directive itself does not support the introduction of this “trigger mechanism”.37 
The requirement for workers to trigger their rights under the Act is unusual, in 
the sense that it has never previously been a feature of Irish labour law.38 
However, where employers do not initiate the process it seems employees 
may have to fight to secure rights under the Act. In non-union workplaces (or, 
indeed, where unions do not promote the legislation) it seems unlikely many 
employees will be aware of their rights, and, even if they are, may be unwilling 
or unable to force their employer’s hand. While the legislation contains 
protection against victimisation for employee representatives,39 it is silent on 
protection for those seeking to establish arrangements. The situation may 
have been more favourable (at least in unionised workplaces) had trade 
unions been allowed to make applications on behalf of employees, but there 
is no provision for such an application. Speculation that employers are 
unlikely to take a proactive stance on information and consultation rights, as 
there is little expectation of employees requesting such rights, is supported by 
the (admittedly early) evidence.40 Furthermore, for those employees who do 
attempt to access their rights and ask for information and consultation 
arrangements to be put in place, if the 10% threshold is not met (that is, 
where an insufficient number of employees support the request) 2 years must 
pass before a further request can be made.41  
As noted, provision is made for three types of information and 
consultation agreements. Pre-existing agreements allow employers and 
employees and/or their representatives to customise information and 
consultation arrangements, either through the retention of existing 
arrangements or the establishment of new arrangements, prior to the date the 
Act comes into force for the relevant undertaking.42 Such agreements must be 
in writing and available for inspection by employees.43 The agreement must 
be approved by a majority of voting employees, (or through some other 
agreed mechanism44) but, again, only where rights under the Act are 
                                               
35
 Section 7(2). 
36
 John Geary and William Roche, “The Future of Information and Consultation in Ireland” in 
Storey ed, note 28, at 186. 
37
 Hayes, note 15. 
38
 The Collective Redundancies legislation, for example, imposes an obligation on employers 
to inform and consult (Protection of Employment Act 1977, section 9). As Hayes points out, it 
seems odd that employees must trigger rights under the 2006 Act in relation to decisions 
likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual relations, whilst, in 
a situation where redundancy becomes a possibility, employers at some point in the 
consultation process would become obliged to inform and consult under the 1977 Act. 
39
 Section 13. 
40
 Tony Dobbins “Apathy Reigns on Information & Consultation, Despite Minister’s Move” 
(2007) 12 IRN 1. See also Mark Hall, “A Cool Response to the ICE Regulations? Employer 
and Trade Union Approaches to the New Legal Framework for Information and Consultation” 
(2006) 37 IRJ 456. 
41
 Section 7(8). 
42
 Section 9. 
43
 Section 9(2). 
44
 Section 9(3). 
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“triggered”, and may be for a specified term or open-ended.45 The agreement 
must make reference to duration and procedures for renegotiation (if 
applicable), the subjects for information and consultation, the method and 
timeframe by which information is to be provided and by which consultation is 
to be conducted (including, in both cases, whether this is to be directly or 
through representatives, see below), and the procedure for dealing with 
confidential information.46  
Section 8 provides for negotiated agreements (following an employee 
request or an employer’s initiative), providing the employer and the 
employees and/or their representatives with the opportunity to devise their 
own tailor-made information and consultation agreement through negotiations. 
The agreement must be approved by a majority of voting employees or their 
representatives elected or appointed under the Act, or through some other 
agreed mechanism.47 The agreements must make reference to the same 
issues as those outlined above in respect of pre-existing agreements.48 
Both of these agreements fall some way short of the “Standard Rules” 
provisions of section 7, which, arguably, embody more accurately the spirit of 
the Directive.49 This is a fallback position for setting up an information and 
consultation arrangement where the employer refuses to enter into 
negotiations or where the parties have entered into negotiations but cannot 
reach agreement within the specified time limit.50 The key element in the 
Standard Rules is the establishment of an Information and Consultation 
Forum. Ballots for election to the Forum are to be organised by the 
employer,51 or, in the absence of elections, representatives are to be 
appointed by employees by means of a procedure agreed with the 
employer.52 This forum (detailed procedural rules for which are laid out in 
Schedule 1 to the Act) would meet at least twice a year, would be resourced 
by the employer, and, as such, would approximate in many ways a works 
council-type arrangement. Information must be supplied by the employer at 
the time, in the fashion, and with the content appropriate to enable the Forum 
to prepare for consultation. Unlike agreements under sections 8 and 9, the 
subjects for information and consultation are specified as including: 
 
                                               
45
 Section 9(5). 
46
 Section 9(7). A view had been expressed (see Connolly, note 30) that the publication of the 
draft legislation would lead to many employers commencing the process of preparing a 
consultation agreement applicable to the needs of the local enterprise. This has not happened 
to any appreciable extent, (see Tony Dobbins, “Unions Hold Workshops on Consultation Law” 
(2007) 25 Industrial Relations News 20) possibly due to the fact that employers feel it is 
unlikely, for reasons outlined above, that employees will actually access their rights under the 
legislation. Two notable exceptions were agreements signed by Tesco (with the retail 
workers’ union Mandate) and Hewlett Packard (with the Irish Bank Officials’ Organisation-the 
IBOA). 
47
 Section 8(3). 
48
 Section 8(5). 
49
 Mark Hall, “Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations” (2005) 
34 ILJ 103. 
50
 6 months, which can be extended by agreement between the parties; sections 7(6) and 
7(7). 
51
 Schedule 2. 
52
 Schedule 1. 
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(a) information on the recent and probable development of the 
undertaking’s activities and economic situation; 
(b) information and consultation on the situation, structure and 
probable development of employment within the undertaking and on 
any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a 
threat to employment; 
(c) information and consultation on decisions likely to lead to 
substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual relations… 
 
Furthermore, the Standard Rules explicitly require the engagement by the 
employer with employee representatives and rule out the “direct involvement” 
systems provided for in section 11. The latter has proved one of the more 
controversial provisions in the legislation. It provides that, for both negotiated 
and pre-existing agreements, employees may receive information and 
consultation either through representatives or directly.53 To make a change 
from a system of direct involvement to one involving representatives, at least 
10% of employees who operate under the direct involvement system in the 
undertaking are required to make a written request to the employer or to the 
Labour Court.54 Any change must then be approved by a majority of the 
employees who operate under the direct involvement system.55  This has 
become known as the “Intel clause” as it is rumoured to have been furiously 
lobbied for by the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland on behalf of US 
multinationals based in the country. In fact, the legislation, in practice, 
arguably privileges direct voice mechanisms as, if employers have the 
opportunity to comply with the letter of the law by using only direct 
arrangements, there seems little incentive to try and comply with the spirit of 
the Directive, which seems to promote a more process-driven, trust-based 
and representative model. Practically speaking, it is also difficult to see how a 
meaningful exchange of views and dialogue (the essence of consultation) can 
take place, or agreement be reached, directly in a medium-, or large-sized- 
organisation.56 It is questionable, too, whether direct arrangements would 
satisfy the interpretation given to “consultation” by the ECJ in the Junk case.57 
There, in the context of the collective redundancies legislation, the ECJ held 
that consultation “imposes an obligation to negotiate”58 and emphasised that 
consultation “with a view to reaching agreement” involves the possibility of 
compromise and change.59 The Court stressed that it would be “much more 
difficult for workers’ representatives to achieve the withdrawal of a decision 
that has been taken than to secure the abandonment of a decision that is 
being contemplated”.60 The direct involvement provision has been a big factor 
behind the trade union ambivalence to the legislation, as it explicitly allows a 
non-collectivist approach. Its inclusion ensured that unions were always going 
                                               
53
 For example, by way of email or through face-to-face meetings with individual employees. 
54
 Section 11(2). 
55
 Section 11(4). 
56
 See also Hayes, note 15. 
57
 Case C–188/03 Wolfgang Kühnel v Junk [2005] ECR I-885; 1 CMLR 42. 
58
 Case C–188/03 [2005] ECR I-885; 1 CMLR 42, at [43]. 
59
 Ciarán O’ Mara, “Calling Time on Collective Dismissals-the Junk Case” (2005) 2 IELJ 68. 
60
 Case C–188/03 [2005] ECR I-885; 1 CMLR 42, at [44]. 
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to be sceptical of State (and employer) motives and somewhat suspicious of 
promoting the legislation.  
 
Representative Challenge 
Section 6 defines employees’ representatives as employees of the 
undertaking, elected or appointed for the purposes of the Act. The employer is 
obliged to arrange for the election or appointment of representatives.61 Where 
it is the practice of the employer to conduct collective bargaining negotiations 
with a trade union or excepted body that represents 10% or more of the 
employees in the undertaking, the Act provides that employees who are 
members of that trade union or excepted body are entitled to elect or appoint 
from amongst their members one or more than one employees’ 
representative(s).62 The parties themselves can determine the overall number 
of representatives, except in relation to the Standard Rules, which prescribe 
the number of representatives allowed in relation to the Information and 
Consultation Forum.63 This is one area where the Irish trade unions have 
fared better than their UK counterparts as, unlike in the UK, the Irish 
legislation does grant a privileged position to workplace representatives of 
recognised trade unions. However, the definition of employee representatives 
does not seem to allow any role for external union officials (as is provided for 
by the legislation on European Works Councils64) nor does it seem to allow for 
external expert assistance when the original information and consultation 
arrangements are negotiated. The latter point is perhaps even more acute in 
non-union organisations. It may be the case that employee representatives 
will not be experienced or skilled enough to effectively negotiate around the 
complex issues of subjects for discussion, confidentiality and so on, especially 
if faced with a phalanx of company human resources and legal specialists. 
Denying employee representatives access to external, independent advice, 
undoubtedly runs the risk that negotiated arrangements will be management-
driven, and thus unlikely to address employee concerns about real 
involvement in decision-making. There is also a risk that, once arrangements 
are in place, employee representatives (who after all work for the 
organisation) will be less able to be open and critical in their views, and less 
able to prevent a management-dominated agenda without external, 
independent assistance.65  Furthermore, although employee representatives 
                                               
61
 Section 6(2). 
62
 Section 6(3). This is to be done on a pro-rata basis with other elected or appointed 
representatives; section 6(4). Note that, in Ryanair [2007] IESC 6, the Supreme Court ruled 
that where an employer has an internal, non-union collective bargaining unit in place, which 
has a degree of permanency and is not ad hoc, this unit could constitute an “excepted body”. 
Therefore its members could have rights to sit in any alternate information and consultation 
forum. Were an employer to set up such an internal bargaining unit, the employer could 
presumably decide on issues such as how employees would be elected or chosen to be 
members, the remit of the Council, and the terms of office of its members; see Doherty, note 
11. 
63
 The Forum shall have at least 3 but not more than 30 members; Schedule 1. 
64
 Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996, section 3. 
65
 However, as Hayes, note 15, points out, it is true that information and consultation 
processes are different from collective bargaining processes and the exclusion of full-time 
officials could be justified on the basis that involvement in both could result in a conflict of 
interest. 
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are entitled to “reasonable facilities, including time off”66 to fulfil their functions, 
the extent of time and training that they get will be totally dependent on 
managerial whim. No provision exists, for example, for representatives to 
meet periodically with all the other employees they represent.  
Section 14 imposes an obligation of confidence on employee 
representatives and participants in information and consultation arrangements 
in relation to the disclosure of confidential information. The employer is not 
required to disclose information or undertake consultation where to do so 
would seriously harm the functioning of the undertaking, or be prejudicial to 
the undertaking.67 Disputes as to how information is classified are to be 
referred to the Labour Court and in coming to a decision the Court may be 
assisted by a panel of experts.68 The interpretation of what is to be classed as 
confidential is likely to be crucial in determining the parameters of the 
legislation and its practical impact in terms of employee involvement in the 
enterprise.   
 
Policing Standards 
The legislation is to be policed by inspectors with wide-ranging powers 
of entry and examination, and failure to comply with the requests or direction 
of such an inspector is an offence.69 As many inspectors as the Minister for 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment deems appropriate are to be appointed.70 
Although the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA) was established 
in February 2007 (initially on an interim basis) as a result of an agreement 
reached in the social partnership agreement Towards 2016, and there is a 
commitment under that agreement to increase the number of Labour 
Inspectors by 200% to 90,71 recent evidence suggests that general 
compliance with employment standards remains a matter of some concern.72 
In its preliminary summary of investigations in 2007, the NERA revealed that 
56% of more than 400 inspections of the construction sector and 61% of 
some 200 inspections of the catering sector detected breaches of 
legislation.73 With inspectors struggling to enforce standards in areas like the 
minimum wage, protecting young workers and protecting migrant workers, it 
seems unlikely that information and consultation rights will be an area of 
priority, and it seems more likely that monitoring by employees themselves 
(and trade unions where present) will be more important in securing 
compliance with the 2006 Act.  
Disputes concerning negotiations for an information and consultation 
agreement under sections 8 or 10, the interpretation or operation of 
agreements under sections 8, 9, and 10, or the interpretation or operation of a 
                                               
66
 Section 13. 
67
 Section 14(4). 
68
 Section 15(8). 
69
 Section 18. 
70
 Section 18(2). 
71
 The Employment Law Compliance Bill is being drafted at the time of writing. 
72
 The issue almost collapsed the social partnership process in the wake of the Irish Ferries 
controversy and accounted for a significant portion of the Towards 2016 agreement (see Part 
2, section VII). 
73
 Concern about compliance with employment standards was not limited to the 
aforementioned sectors; see “Job to Enforce Law” Irish Times, 18 January 2008. 
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direct involvement system under section 11 are to be referred to the Labour 
Court.74 Such referrals are to be made only once internal dispute resolution 
procedures have failed to resolve the dispute and the matter has been 
referred to the Labour Relations Commission.75 Disputes relating to matters of 
confidentiality under section 14 are also to be referred to the Labour Court76 
and any determination can be enforced through the Circuit Court.77 In terms of 
criminal sanctions for those in breach of the legislation,78 the Act provides for 
a fine of up to €3,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to 6 months for a 
summary conviction, and a fine of up to €30,000 and/or a prison sentence of 
up to 36 months for a conviction on indictment. There has been some concern 
as to the extent to which the penalties provided for can be said to be 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, as required by the Directive.79 The 
first draft of the Directive provided for injunctive relief where employers 
proceeded with decisions in breach of their obligations, stating that: 
 
Member States should provide that in case of serious breach by the 
employer of its obligations to consult in relation to decisions likely to 
lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual 
relations, any decisions having direct and immediate consequences 
would have no legal effect on the employment contracts or employment 
relationships affected.80 
 
However, this was removed from the final version. It is questionable whether a 
fine of €30,000 would be “dissuasive” to a medium- or large sized-
organisation (it stretches credibility to think it might be so in the case of a 
large multinational, for example) and such a fine, in any case, would only 
apply in respect of the most serious of breaches. The first case in which a 
penalty was imposed under the UK legislation81 involved a failure by 
Macmillan Publishers Ltd to hold a ballot for the election of employee 
representatives as required.82 The UK Employment Appeals Tribunal stated 
that, although the company’s actions did not constitute the most serious 
breach of the regulations that could be envisaged, they were nonetheless a 
very grave breach affecting many employees and fixed the penalty at £55,000 
(someway short of the £75,000 maximum penalty83). Although the penalty 
imposed here was significantly greater than the maximum that could be 
applied by the Irish courts, the Assistant General Secretary of the union 
involved questioned whether the level of the fine would act as a sufficient 
                                               
74
 Section 15(1). 
75
 Section 15(2). 
76
 Section 15(4). 
77
 Section 17. 
78
 Primarily employers, but also those who breach confidentiality requirements. 
79
 See also Case C-382-92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435; ICR 664, 
where the ECJ found the existing UK regime for consultation of employees in the case of 
collective redundancies to be inadequate. 
80
 Ewing and Truter, note 33, at 634. 
81
 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004, SI No. 2346 of 2004. 
82
 Amicus v Macmillan Publishers Limited UKEAT/0185/07/RN. 
83
 The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004, Regulation 23. 
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deterrent for a large, global company like Macmillan in the future.84 It is 
important to remember, too, that there is no provision in the Irish Act for the 
compensation of employees affected by an employer’s breach of the 
legislation.  
 
The first recommendation by the Labour Court under the 2006 Act was issued 
in February 2008.85 The Labour Court concluded that a complaint by health 
unions that the Health Services Executive (HSE) did not consult them about a 
recruitment freeze and cutbacks was “well-founded” and that the HSE 
contravened an information and consultation agreement between the parties 
(concluded under section 9 of the 2006 Act), and by extension the Act itself, 
by “its failure to inform and consult with the unions in advance of its 
breakeven initiative”. The Court recommended that the HSE should assure 
the unions that should the need for a similar initiative arise in the future full 
and adequate consultation will take place, but did not consider it appropriate 
to make any further recommendations in the case. Thus, no sanction was 
imposed for the breach of the Act in the instant case.  
 
Conclusion 
Section 12 of the 2006 Act provides that when defining or implementing 
practical arrangements for information and consultation, the employer, 
employees and/or their representatives must work in a spirit of cooperation. 
One of the defining features of this legislation, however, has been the distinct 
lack of cooperation on view between employers and labour throughout its 
gestation. Despite the existing lack of legal support for consultation and 
involvement arrangements in Ireland and the government’s strong 
commitment to social partnership,86 it came as little surprise to many that the 
Irish government (following extensive lobbying from the Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation-IBEC-and the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Ireland) initially opposed the Directive. Once it became clear its passing was 
inevitable, Ireland and the UK, in particular, pushed for maximum ”flexibility” in 
terms of its requirements.87 Surprisingly, after almost 20 years of social 
partnership, Irish trade unions and employers were unable to agree a national 
framework agreement to assist employers, employees and their 
representatives in meeting obligations under the Act.88 There is also no 
mention whatsoever of the Directive in the latest national agreement, Towards 
2016.  
                                               
84
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2007/08/articles/uk0708039i.htm (visited 18 January 
2008). 
85
 Recommendation No. RIC081 Health Service Executive v Health Service Staff Panel 
86
 And, in particular, partnership at the level of the enterprise, see note 29. 
87
 John Geary, “Employee Voice in the Irish Workplace: Status and Prospect” in Peter Boxall, 
Paul Haynes and Robert Freeman eds, Employee Voice in the Anglo-American World 
(Cornell University Press, 2006). 
88
 A Code of Practice on Information and Consultation was issued by the Labour Relations 
Commission (LRC) in March 2008 (in accordance with section 42 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1990). The LRC drew on a number of sources in preparing the Code, including 
“consultation with the social partners” (section 2). 
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Given the various problems highlighted above (the need to trigger 
rights, the exclusion from the scope of the law of many organisations and 
certain categories of employee, the lack of protection given to those seeking 
to establish information and consultation arrangements, the provision for 
direct involvement systems, the difficulties in enforcement and the question 
mark over the adequacy of penalty provisions) it seems unlikely that the Act 
will plug the “voluntarist gaps” in the Irish IR system and grant robust 
collective involvement and participation rights to Irish employees.89 In the 
early months since the legislation has been in place very little activity has 
been reported.90 It seems that most employers have adopted a strategy of 
“risk assessment” rather than active compliance.91 As noted above, in the one 
recommendation made by the Labour Court under the Act to date, no sanction 
was imposed on an employer in breach of an information and consultation 
agreement. Moreover, the factual background upon which the health unions 
referred their claim under the 2006 Act also grounded a claim that the HSE’s 
failure to consult them on its cost-cutting plans was a breach of several 
provisions of the Towards 2016 social partnership agreement (especially 
28.13 and 30.2). The Labour Court upheld this claim also and issued an 
identical recommendation to that issued under the 2006 Act; that the HSE 
should assure the unions that should the need for a similar initiative arise in 
the future full and adequate consultation will take place, but that it was not 
appropriate to make any further recommendations in the case.92 In other 
words, the unions’ claim could have been processed through the social 
partnership process irrespective of whether the 2006 Act was in place or 
not.93 
Nor is the legislation likely to provide much of a platform for trade 
unions to expand their representation rights. Where unions do not first have 
some sort of presence at a workplace, it is unlikely (given that unions cannot 
make applications on behalf of their members to establish information and 
consultation arrangements) that the Act will grant an “in” for them.  Even 
where the problems above are negotiated and rights in a workplace are 
triggered no role exists for the external union, and we have seen that 
concerns exist about how adequately employee representatives, in the 
absence of external advice, will be able to establish and utilise any structures 
that are set up. The unions have been somewhat muted in their reaction to 
                                               
89
 Nor does the transposition seem to live up to the lofty ideals of the Commission’s worker 
involvement agenda, see discussion above and Barnard, note 26, at 701 et seq. The directive 
itself claims in the Recitals to seek “to reform the existing legal frameworks for employee 
information and consultation at Community and national level, which tend to adopt an 
excessively a posteriori approach to the process of change… strengthen dialogue and 
promote mutual trust within undertakings… promote employee involvement in the operation 
and future of the undertaking and increase its competitiveness”. 
90
 Dobbins, note 40. 
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 Hall, note 49. 
92
 Recommendation No. LCR19152 Health Service Executive v Psychiatric Nurses 
Association, Irish Hospital Consultants Association and Health Service Staff Panel 
93
 Of course, this point is relevant only to situations where employers and unions have signed 
up to the partnership agreement; the 2006 Act would provide the only possible route for 
employees or their representatives to challenge any breach of consultation obligations by the 
employer in situations where the latter has not signed up to partnership process. 
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the Act94 fearing tensions might arise in unionised workplaces regarding the 
overlap between the roles of any information and consultation body and 
established collective bargaining arrangements, as well as between union and 
non-union employee representatives.  
The information and consultation legislation has been described as an 
example of ”reflexive” employment law whereby “the preferred mode of 
intervention is for the law to underpin and encourage autonomous processes 
of adjustment” by the parties to the employment relationship ”rather than to 
intervene by imposing particular distributive outcomes”.95 The social 
partnership process, with its emphasis on promoting workplace partnership, 
has its origins in the similar (corporatist) idea of the partners “bargaining in the 
shadow of the law”. The problem with the 2006 Act is that the shadow is very 
faint indeed.96 The Act also seems to be insufficiently encouraging of actors to 
produce the “second-order effects” intended by reflexive law.97 The State and 
the social partners have not, for example, provided a list of possible topics for 
information and consultation98 and, as noted, the most recent national 
agreement does not mention the legislation at all. In this sense the legislation 
perhaps marks a move away from the principle of voluntarism, but not the 
practice. 
Are there any reasons for optimism that the legislation may have a 
greater impact than is predicted here? It may be that the legislation will 
become more important in the context of the commitments in Towards 2016 to 
step up employment rights compliance and the setting up of a new Office of 
the Director for Employment Rights Compliance.99  However, this will only be 
useful in the event that employees have already triggered the provisions (or 
have been prevented from so doing). It may also be that the neutering of the 
Industrial Relations Acts 2001-2004 in the Ryanair case may mean trade 
unions refocus efforts on using the legislation as a platform for gaining 
increased influence and/or recognition rights.100  
It may also be in employers’ interests to become more proactive in 
relation to the legislation. This may be because more employers become 
convinced of the merits of the “business case” for robust information and 
consultation rights.101  Alternatively, and more cynically perhaps, employers 
may attempt to exploit the utility of the legislation as a defensive mechanism. 
First, as Gollan points out, in the context of union density decline, many 
issues that in the past would have been the subject of collective bargaining in 
unionised workplaces may now fall under the rubric of information and 
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 Dobbins, note 46. 
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 Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, “In Search of Coherence: Social Policy, the Single 
Market and Fundamental Rights” (2000) 31 IRJ 331, at 341. 
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 This, unfortunately, appears also to be the case in relation to the European Works Council 
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 Barnard and Deakin, note 95 
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consultation in non-union settings.102 A more expansive approach by 
management to granting effective employee consultation rights could ward off 
any incipient demands for collective bargaining in such workplaces. Second, it 
may be the case that anti-union employers can use the legislation to de-
recognise unions (or resist union recognition drives) in favour of the 
alternative of an information and consultation forum or arrangement which 
ostensibly represents all employees. 
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